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INFORMAL LOGIC

XIII.2, Spring 1991

Critical Study
Woods and Walton on the Fallacies, 1972-19821
LEO GROARKE

Woods, John and Walton, Douglas. (1989).

Fallacies: Selected Papers 1972-1982.
(Series: "Studies of Argumentation in Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis" ed. Frans
H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst.)
Dordrecht-HollandlProvidence, RI-USA:
Foris. Pp. xxi, 322. ISBN 90 6765 305 5,
paper. ISBN 90 67653063, cloth.
I

For many reasons, this should prove to
be a useful volume for those interested in
the fallacies. Ii collects together essays by
two of the most prolific writers In the field,
pays tribute to their pioneering work. and
contributes a body of literature which will
help legitimize a field of study which is only
now gaining the attention it deserves. I shall
subsequently argue that there are important
ways in which one might criticize the
approach to fallacies that Woods anQ Walton develop, though it would be a mistake to
dismiss this collection on that account.
Every approach is susceptible to criticism
and the important point is that the book
raises deep questions about the nature of
informal logic and argumentation theory
that need to be discussed-in particular.
questions about its development as a discipline which is increasingly distinct from
formal logic.
Though I cannot pursue a comparison in
any detail here, it would be interesting to
contrast the views and opinions one tinds in
Woods and Walton and those that Trudy
Govier expounds in her very different con-
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tribution to this series ("StUdies of Argumentation in Pragmatics and Discourse
Analysis"), Problems in Argument Analysis
and
Evaluation. 2
The
competing
approaches to argumentation theory defended in these two books (one favouring,
one rejecting, a formal approach) should
helpfully further the dialectic on the question how informal logic and argumentation
theory should develop as a discipline.
The scope of Woods and Walton's book
is impressive-almost all the major fallacies are discussed-and this should make it
an important reference point in discussions
of the fallacies. Its very breadth makes it
difficult to discuss the book in a general
way, however, for one thing that does not
emerge from it is a unified theory of the fallacies. One does find a very general methodology which is repeatedly employed in
discussing fallacies. many glimpses of how
one might go about constructing a unified
theory, and many important insights into the
nature of specific fallacies. But no comprehensive theory is defended. The question
whether the lack of such a theory is a flaw in
the anthology is the first issue I want to
address in thc present study, for it raises
fruitful ruminations about what the hook is,
what it is not, and what it might have heen.
Especially as Woods and Walton are
very modest in their claims ahout what they
have accomplished-themselves suggesting that there is no mature theory of the fallacies (p. xvi)-it might he thought that the
hook's lack of a general theory of the fallacies GlI1not he held against it. Questions
ahout the hook's raison d'etrc cannot. how-
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ever, be so easily dismissed. That we can
use a book like this is clear enough-at the
very least, because it is a convenient reference book for those interested in the
approach to the fallacies Woods and Walton
have developed-but it is equally clear that
it could have been published in a way that
made it more forceful and useful than it is.
It is difficult to read the anthology without being struck by the repetitiveness and
disunity of much of the discussion. The
same (correct, I think) sentiments about the
sad state of fallacy theory are expressed
time and time again and many of Woods and
Walton's more specific claims are made in a
variety of articles that repeat rather than
strengthen the points made. There is no
attempt to unify the often overlapping treatments of adverecundiam (the subject of two
chapters), ad hominem (the subject of two
chapters), petitio principii (the subject of
six chapters), and composition and division
(discussed in two chapters), and standard
views and terms-the Lockean view of ad
hominem, the formalism used in discussing
composition and division-are introduced
more than once. Cross references between
the chapters give page references for original journal articles rather than the present
book-something which is most annoying
if one decides to pursue cross references.
Finally, the text contains many typos and
misprints, some of them serious (see p. 224,
e.g.), and does not address important questions about the relationship between the
material in different chapters. The approach
to petitio principii investigated in Chapter
6, for example, seems beside the point given
that it is undermined by other chapters that
convincingly establish that we must adopt
an epistemic approach to the fallacy, something that Woods and Walton themselves
suggest in their concluding remarks}
These aspects of the book can, to a great
extent, be excused if it is intended only as a
convenient collection for historical or for
reference purposes. Still, one may have
hoped for more and the reasons Woods and
Walton give for proceeding in the way they
do are not entirely convincing. On p. xiii,

they explain that:
The papers recur here with minimal adjustment and, so appear with their original
imperfections, undisturbed by hindsight.
We do not particularly relish displaying our
early oversimplifications of complex problems, but think that doing so is warranted by
two consideration[sl. First, some of the
oversimplifications are instructive, and, second, arranged in their pristine form, the
papers will show, with some accuracy, a certain development in our views of the fallacies and our methods for dealing with them.

The "certain development" in Woods and
Walton's views referred to here is not, however, obvious, and one wishes that it were
made so. Nor is it clear why a careful
reworking of the essays in the book would
weaken the other features of the book that
Woods and Walton think important. There
is, for example, no reason why reworked
versions of the essays could not begin with
the oversimplifications they refer to, discuss why they are so and then move on to a
more sophisticated analysis.
Coupled with the elimination of the
repetitiveness and disunity that characterize
the book, such a rewriting would have
added greatly to the finished product. If, as
Woods and Walton say, the chapters of the
book appear with imperfections and oversimplifications they know to be so, it seems
entirely appropriate that the original articles
be "disturbed" by hindsight or at least
supplemented by a more extensive
introduction-an introduction which could
address questions about the relationship
between the various articles the book contains. To take but one example: If their
approach entails, as it appears to, a variety
of disparate models of the fallacies that do
not synthesize, then should this not count as
a mark against it? And if not, why not? I
expect that Woods and Walton have interesting things to say in response to such
questions, but the issues raised by their general approach do not receive much attention
in the present collection, being the focus of
only one of nineteen chapters (Chapter 17,
which I discuss below).
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Perhaps the answer to such ruminations
is another book that can take the themes of
the present volume further and develop
them in a more unified way. Such a volume
would, I think, make a very major contribution to contemporary discussions of the
fallacies. It WOUld, in particular, be useful
to begin with a much more detailed account
of the general approach that Woods and
Walton have developed-an account which
could incorporate a discussion of the
general problems with fallacy theory, a
definition of fallacy that encompasses the
logical, psychological and epistemic points
that Woods and Walton want to make, and a
defense of the use of formalism in the analysis
of fallacies. Given such an introduction,
successive chapters could provide a unified
account of each of the fallacies the present
book discusses. The present volume
contains, in contrast, a collection of overlapping articles which are pertinent to
contemporary discussion, but not bound
together as a unified force-a problem
which may make it difficult to use the
book as a textbook in any but the most
advanced and most specific courses in
informal logic.

II
Putting aside questions about the organization of the book and what it might have
been, its most notable feature is the emphasis it places on the attempt to use various
kinds of formalism in furthering an understanding of the fallacies. In the Introduction, Woods and Walton are very balanced,
rejecting the suggestion that they are "fanatical formalists" (p. xviii) and pointedly
endorsing a methodological pluralism in
studies ofthe fallacies. This healthy attitude
being noted, it must still be said that Woods
and Walton are, in this book, preoccupied
with the attempt to use formal methods in
their discussion of the fallacies. Walton's
recent Inf()rmal Logic: A Handbook fl)f'
Critical Argumentation' adopts, in contrast,
a much less formal approach to hillacies.
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As it is the use of formalism which is the
main distinguishing feature of this collection, I want to emphasize it in my discussion. It may in this regard be helpful to put
my own cards on the table. In particular, I
should say that I am sympathetic to the
claim that informal logicians have not paid
enough attention to formal logic when they
analyze informal inferences. My own sentiments favour an approach that sees formal
and informal logic as endeavours which are
more closely allied than usually assumed.' I
think it is important to emphasize this point
because I am going to offer a critique of the
emphasis that Woods and Walton place on
formalism, but flot because I think that such
an emphasis is necessarily erroneous. 6 On
the contrary, I am inclined toward the formal approach appropriately employed, but
think that Woods and Walton have failed to
vindicate it.
In discussing the formal aspects of
Woods and Walton's essays, we need separate two questions that can be asked in this
regard. The first is the question of whether
their formal analyses of various kinds of
arguments and fallacies are successful in
the sense that they accurately represent the
forms of argument and fallacy (ad baculum,
composition and division, etc.) they are
supposed to represent. The second is the
question whether their formal accounts
convincingly establish that these analyses
should be of central concern to those whose
prime interest is not formal logic, but the
teaching and studying of the fallacies as
they appear in everyday contexts. I will take
the latter to be the central concern of informal logic, though even if this is a mistake it
must at least be admitted that an emphasis
on concrete examples and the applicability
of logical theory have been hallmarks of
informal logic as il has developed. It is in
this regard worlh noting that Woods and
Walton's emphasis on formalism is unusual. and that much of the work on informal
logic in the last twenty years has been
spawned by a dissatist~lction with Ihe 1'01'l11al approach when it is applied III everyday
reasoning.
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It is important to see that the question
whether Woods and Walton's analyses are
formally successful is distinct from the
question whether they demonstrate that
these analyses should be a major concern of
those interested in everyday reasoning. For
even if they are formally accurate, it may
still be asked why they should be of broader
interest. The crux of my critique of Woods
and Walton will be the claim that they do not
provide a convincing answer to this question. In lieu of such an answer, the formal
analyses Woods and Walton propose lose
much of their force even if they are formally
accurate accounts ofthe arguments andfallacies in question. Thus they may still be
interesting from the point of view offormal
logic, but only of very secondary interest
from the point of view of informal logic
-the domain which is, obviously, more relevant to the present journal.
In keeping with such considerations, we
may distinguish two goals we might adopt
when we propose a formal analysis of a fallacy. On the one hand, we might say that formal logic is an endeavour in its own right,
and that the attempt to construct a formal (or
even quasi-formal) account of the fallacies
may be pursued as a problem in formal
logic. Looked at from this point of view, the
problem is essentially mathematical: the
problem of constructing a formal system
with features that mirror, in some important
way, ordinary arguments as they relate to
fallacies. Anyone interested in such problems will find a wealth of ideas in Woods
and Walton-ideas that may inspire further
work in formal logic. Particularly noteworthy is their constant recognition that a variety of formal systems are available for
analysis and make many different tools (relevance logic, modal logic. aggregate theory,
and so on) available when one tries to capture informal reasoning.
Given what has already been said there
is, however, a second way in which we
might approach questions about the possibility of formalizing fallacies. If our concern is the study of ordinary arguments in a
way that emphasizes the practical applica-

tion of one's theory to concrete examples,
then formal techniques are of major interest
only to the extent that they further-and not
merely formalize-our practical ability to
deal with concrete arguments in ordinary
contexts. Utility and applicability in everyday
contexts is the mark of important theoretical
advances from this point of view and forn1al
analyses are of secondary interest pursued
as ends in themselves. Without some significant payoff for our attempt to distinguish
good and bad arguments in actual discourse, an attempt to construct a formal
logic which roughly models particular
forms of argument is not of major importance, though it remains a significant problem
in a related discipline-viz., formal logic.
Once we recognize the distinction
between formal accounts of the fallacies
pursued for formal and informal ends7,
there are problems with any suggestion to
the effect that Woods and Walton's essays
demonstrate the relevance of formal logic to
discussions in informal logic. For rather
than recognize this distinction, they repeatedly ignore it, assuming that an analysis of
the fallacies which has as its goal their accurate formal representation must, assuming it
is successful, be of central importance in
informal logic. Let me once again emphasize that I am not assuming that this is not
the case. On the contrary, I think that such a
view is closer to the mark than most informal logicians will admit. But this is beside
the point. Injudging Woods and Walton, the
important question is whether they demonstrate the significance of formal results and
this cannot be done by relying on an
assumption to this effect. Thus questions
about the significance of formal results in
informal logic are open questions over
which there is much dispute (on the question of onus as it applies to this particular
issue, see the discussion below).8
Woods and Walton's most promising
attempt to move beyond mere assumption is
found in the essay "What is Informal
Logic?"-included as Chapter 17 in the
present book. Discussing the role of formalism in understanding forms of ordinary
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argument, they say that they have "been
impressed to discover two particular advantages in the deployment of formal resources. One is the provision of clarity and
power of representation and definition .... The
other is the provision of verification milieux
for contested claims about various fallacies." (p. 224) This sounds promising, but
these advantages are explicated in a way that
makes them little more than the claim that
formal accounts of the fallacies make their
formal status and structure clearer and more
easily understood. In contrast, there is no
serious attempt to show that such accounts
are practically useful or more applicable to
concrete examples of ordinary arguments
than alternative theoretical approaches.
The claim that formal analysis provides
"clarity and power of representation and
definition" is said to be demonstrated by
such formal considerations as the result that
"circularity models well in Kripke's intuitionistic semantics, and that a reasonable
notion of evidential cumulativeness is also
there definable. Then, too, Burge's formal
theory of aggregates furnishes one with a
quite powerful (though not effective) command of part-whole relations and the theory
of composition plainly benefits from this .... "
(p. 224) The claim that formal analyses
provide "verification milieux for contested
claims about various fallacies" is said to be
demonstrated by the fact that formal analyses
of informal inference lead to the conclusion
that "relevant logic is a better (perhaps only
marginally better) logic of inference than
classical logic, and perhaps, too, that classical logic is a better logic of entailment than
relevant logic. Or, to take another example,
. . . it may be concluded that the salient
part-whole relation is not mereological (any
more than it is set theoretic)." (p. 224)
Even if such claims are true, they cannot
show the informal logician qua informal
logician that formal analysis clarities and
advances the issues and concerns which are
the subject of informal logic. Rather, the
informal logician needs a demonstration
that shows how formal mechanisms allow
us to deal in a better, more interesting, and
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more illuminating way with concrete examples of the kinds of ordinary arguments that
are informal logic's subject matter. For the
most part, this is something that Woods and
Walton never provide. And even in cases
where their analysis does have clear and
interesting consequences for ordinary arguments, the case for fonnalism is still not
convincing, for the important points they
make can be made without the formal systems they employ.9
One cannot demonstrate the importance
of formal analyses by saying and showing
that particular formal systems can be used
to modeL in a more or less accurate way,
particular infonnal phenomena. Indeed, the
assumption that this is all that is required to
demonstrate the usefulness of formal logic
begs the question, assuming that a successful formal analysis forwards the practical
understanding that is the goal of informal
logic. In answer to this assumption, it may
be said that such results may formalize, but
not further, the theory of ordinary argument
and be of interest to the formal rather than
the informal logician.
The assumption in favour of formal
analysis that characterizes Woods and Walton's work is particularly evident when they
summarize their account of informal logic.
On pp. 227-28 they write:
If this [the assumption that the principal
content of informal logic is the fallacies lO]
has been a tolerable assumption. then we
have an answer to the question with which
we began, "What is Informal Logic'?" Nothing is. The theory ofthe t~lllacies is not logic
[because it is "a branch of formal theory that
is essentially extralogical in major respects"
(p. 225) J. though it includes some logic .
indeed quite a bit of logic; and the theory of
the fallacies is not only at its best (IS (I formal
theory. il is difticult 10 see how Ihe suppression of its formal character could leave a I"l'Sidue fully deserving of the name of theory.
Now. this is nol to deny til(l!. on a quite
different interpretation of "informal". there
do exbt perkctly legitimate and familiar
instanccs of informal "In!.!i.:". An anal">!\
with mathcmatics might ~er\e the point ';;t
hand. Mathemalics that is done in the usual.
worl-aday way. Ihat is to sa\. III ordinar~
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mathematical English and prior to any
axiomatic treatment is said to be informal
mathematics ....
But note, these enterprises do not preclude the quite vigorous exercise of what we
have been calling formal methods. On the
contrary, they very much require such an
exercise if they are to attain the generality or
power that commands serious philosophical
attention.

It is hard to see how such remarks could be
acceptable to anyone who is not already
committed to the sentiment that formal
analysis should be the goal oflogic. Among
other things, they assume that logic must be
understood as "a branch of formal theory";
that an interesting theory of informal logic
must have a basis in formal analysis; that
without the latter informal logic cannot
attain the generality and power that commands serious philosophical attention; and
that we should adopt mathematics as a
model of the kind of theory we should aim
for in trying to develop a useful theory of
ordinary arguments.
But why should informal logicians
accept the claim that the theory of the fallacies is not logic if it is not a fully fledged formal theory? Or the claim that it must, at its
best, be a formal theory? Or the claim that
the suppression of its formal character cannot leave a residue which deserves the name
of theory? These are claims that many of the
most influential informal logiciansGovier, e.g.--question, yet I cannot find a
place in Woods and Walton where such
claims are defended (the proposed analogy
with mathematics is something I will tum to
shortly).
What is needed to make Woods and
Walton's claims convincing is a defense of
these assumptions about the primacy of formal theory that shows that we can better
understand ordinary arguments by taking
formal logic as our paradigm. But then we
are back to the problem I noted earlier, for
Woods and Walton do not provide any such
defense, usually proposing their formal
analyses without applying them to concrete
examples of ordinary arguments. In cases

where their analysis has important consequences for informal logic, their claims do
not depend on formalism. In other cases, it
is even arguable that their formalism actually obscures the issues that are pertinent to
informallogic. 1l
One might try to answer this criticism
by appealing to the mathematical analogy
Woods and Walton have proposed. But the
analogy also begs the question, assumingnot proving-that informal logic must, like
informal mathematics, be an analogue of
some more respectable formal theory. But
why should we believe that informal logic
must adopt formal methods if it i~ to attain
the generality or power that commands serious philosophical attention? There is a
school of philosophy that portrays deontic
logic as the goal of ethics, epistemic logic as
the goal of epistemology, formal representations of the emotions as the goal of philosophical analyses of the emotions, and so
on, but it is much less influential than it once
was and many contemporary philosophers
have rebelled against it as too constricting,
naive, and not applicable to the intricacies
of real life situations. Even if one does not
accept these criticisms, there are problems
with the Woods and Walton assumption in
favour of the mathematical analogy, for
they at least owe us a discussion of such criticisms and a much more substantial account
of the reasons they think we should prefer
formal to informal methods of analysis.
III

Having argued that Woods and Walton
do not make a convincing case for formal
methods in informal logic, I hasten to add
that there is much of interest in what they
have to say. Most obviously, their analyses
are of interest to anyone interested in the
attempt to construct formal representations
of various aspects of informal reasoning.
More importantly in the present context,
some of their analyses have important consequences for much broader issues. I want
to illustrate the latter by turning to their
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account of ad baculum, but first I want to
add something to my critique of their use of
formal methods.
So far, I have claimed that Woods and
Walton fail to defend their commitment to
the formal approach convincingly. One
might, however, answer that this is a case of
misplaced onus. Given a long history of the
use of formal methods in logic as a discipline,
it might be said that one can plausibly
assume the relevance of fonnal methods and
that the onus must be placed on those who
reject them to defend this rejection. This
makes a commitment to formalism a premise
of inquiry rather than a conclusion of it, but
such an attitude deserves some comment.
In answer to such a stand, we might
review some of the reasons one might doubt
or at least question the use of formal methods in informal logic-reasons that create
an onus that demands a defense of any such
an approach. We have already noted that we
no longer live in a time when the appropriateness of the formal model can be
assumed, but it is worth expanding on the
reasons why this is so. In my estimation, the
following doubts have, in particular, fueled
questions about the usefulness of formalism
in informal logic.
Firstly, there are doubts that arise from
the inaccessibility of formal methods,
which assume a background in a technical
discipline which is, on the face of it, unnecessary for an appreciation of good and bad
ordinary arguments. Obviously, one can be
a good reasoner in day to day contexts without having studied mathematical logic-or
a bad reasoner even if one has studied
it-and this suggests that ordinary reasoning is a realm which is quite distinct from
mathematical modes of reasoning. And this
in turn suggests that one should be able to
understand the difference between good
and bad reasoning without having the technical training required by the formal
approach. One might even argue that the
formal approach is politically objectionable.
making good reasoning the property of a very
exclusionary group of technical experts. 12
Putting aside such questions. it is worth
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noting the various ways in which formal
methods may not only not advance, but
actually obscure or obstruct, the kind of
understanding that is the goal of informal
logic. To begin with, it might be said that a
commitment to a formal approach may
interfere with an understanding of informal
inference just because it excludes alternative approaches that may be preferable.
Consider, for example, Woods and Walton's
account of petitio principii. It suggestscorrectly, I think-that the fallacy needs to
be seen as an epistemic fallacy which is
relative to the knowledge and views of
particular individuals. One can try to capture this aspect of the fallacy by trying to
construct an appropriate epistemic logic,
but it seems simpler and more appropriate
to appeal to rhetoric and its long and
involved discussions of audience and the
role it plays in argumentation. Given a preoccupation with formalism this is not, however, an avenue of investigation that Woods
and Walton consider.
In other cases, the complexity and
sophistication of formal accounts of informal inference interfere with the kind of
understanding which is necessary if one
wants to distinguish good and bad reasoning
in ordinary contexts. At their best, formal
analyses do force us to think carefully about
the nature of ordinary inferences. A decision in favour of the Stalnaker corner as a
model for conditionals must, for example.
be predicated on some careful thinking
about the way that conditional inferences
work in ordinary language-why they are
or are not adequately represented by material implication, for example. Especially in
view of the elegance and simplicity of Stalnaker's account, it seems reasonable to
think that we can learn a great deal from
such an analysis. But it is much more difficult. even in this case, to be sure that we Gill
draw any substantive conclusions for inti.)rmal logic. On the contrary. it is hard to think
of contexts where the Stalnaker analysis
would allow us to make inferellces we
would otherwise reject. espedally as SOI11(,one who do('s not acc('pt slIdl infen:nc('s
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always has the option of rejecting the Stalnaker system. It is our intuitions about ordinary inferences which are, in the end, the
basis of the formal accounts that we adopt,
hence it is difficult (though not perhaps
impossible) to overrule them.
Whatever one thinks of Stalnaker conditionals, such problems are greatly exacerbated when one pursues formal analyses of
much greater complexity-complexity
which makes it difficult to apply our ordinary intuitions. In many cases, the end
result is a move toward formal simplicity
that loses sight of the informal inference it is
supposed to capture. In Woods and Walton,
one finds an example of such problems in
their account of ad ignorantiam. Noting
that they have some interesting things to say
about ad ignorantiam, 13 it must still be said
that problems arise when they attempt to
develop a formal account of ad ignorantiam
as it occurs in the context of onus of proof.
Here their discussion focuses on the following example:
The simplest scenario is where we might
have a debate between Mr. X and Mr. Y, and
Mr. X at some point in the debate aggressively asserts that p. Then later in the debate
Mr. X may aggressively demand that Mr. Y
produce evidence of the negation of p, in a
case where Mr. Y has expressed or implied
disbelief that p obtains .... In this case it
may be quite unreasonable, even fallacious,
for X to insist that Y produce evidence for
p's negation. Since Mr. X originally asserted
that p, it would seem that the obligation is his
to marshall evidence inp's behalf. (p. 166)

Woods and Walton propose that one deal
with such cases by appealing to formal
games that can be used to model discussion
in a dialogue.
A dialectical game that begins to capture the
ad ignorantiam suggested by the simple
scenario above requires a rule allowing the
questioner to put forward Why p?1without
requiring that his question be open to the
same sorts of justitication procedures covering the case of the rcspondent who opts to
assert one of the pair {p, "'p J in response to a
question. For this simplest case, the kind of
mechanism requircd is illustrated by a syn-

r

tactical rule in Hamblin's "Why-BecauseSystems-With-Questions" ... [Woods and
Walton go on to elaborate a particular rule,
S3]. Transparent attempts to shift the burden
of proof unfairly, as in the scenario we considered earlier, can now be classed as violations of S3. For example, the following
specimen of dialogue between a and b is
barred by syntax rule S3 [because it does not
allow a participant in the dialogue to answer
a question of the form "Why X?" with the
question "Why ..,X'!"].
b: WhyS?
a: Why"'S?
... The simplest cases of ad ignorantiam can
[thus1be carefull y understood as syntactical
aberrations of dialectic. (p. 167)

This treatment suggests that the case in
question is understood and adequately
accounted for given that it can now be
understood as a violation of one of the rules
(S3) within a particular formal game. More
complex cases will require more complex
formal systems but are, in principle, to be
treated in a similar way.
Some reflection on questions of onus in
ordinary contexts shows that there are serious problems with this account. Rule S3
implies that the burden of proof in a dialogue is a function of the order in which
claims and questions are proposed. In the
scenario Woods and Walton discuss, it does
not allow Mr. X to shift the burden of proof
to Mr. Y because Mr. Y has asked "Why p?"
and cannot, therefore, be answered with the
question "Why "'p?". But if Mr X had been
quicker to the mark and asked Mr. Y "Why
"'p?" first, then the same rule bars Mr. Y
from asking "Why p?". One way to prevail
in a dialogue which is structured in this way
will be to ask, as quickly as possible, one's
interlocutor to defend hislher commitments, for this creates an onus which cannot
be reversed. Assuming straightforward
rules in a dialogue, it will in most cases be
possible for the first person who issues such
a challenge to undermine any argument
their interlocutor provides by repeatedly
creating a new onus on the part of their
interlocutor, asking questions of the form
"Why p?" where p is any proposition which
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is not a theorem.
Clearly, something has gone wrong
with this analysis. Onus depends on something more than the order in which claims
are made and evidence is asked for in a dialogue. We can get some idea of what it
depends on if we consider an example. Suppose then that the proposition p that Mr. X
has asserted in Woods and Walton's initial
scenario is the proposition "Genocide is
wrong." Suppose then that, as the scenario
suggests, Mr. Y demands a defense of p,
asking why he should believe that this is so.
Mr. X might answer with an explanation,
but he could also reasonably ask of Mr. Y
why he imagines otherwise. Genocide
seems obviously wrong and morally odious; why then should we believe otherwise?
In asking such questions, Mr. X reverses the
onus, violating S3 and committing what
Woods and Walton suggest as a likely fallacy. But this is a case where the reversal of
onus does not seem unreasonable, just
because the content of the statement Mr. X
makes puts an onus on anyone who thinks
otherwise-anyone who thinks that genocide is permissible-to defend their point of
view. This and many similar examples we
could easily concoct show that onus
depends not on the order in which claims
and questions are proposed, but on the
inherent plausibility or implausibility or the
content of the claims in question.
This is not the place to work out a
detailed account of onus or the notion of
plausibility this implies, especially as it is a
complex notion fraught with philosophical
questions and it is arguable that what is
plausible varies from context to context and
audience to audience. In the present context, it is enough to note that such considerations undermine the tidy formal analysis
Woods and Walton approach, and that it is
informal issues of this sort-not the development of elaborate formal games-which
are the key to sorting out onus in ordinary
arguments.
One could, of course, try to formalize
the account of onus I have just suggested.
The rules of a formal dialogue might, for
example, allow "Why -8'1" as an answer to
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the question "Why S?" just in case S was a
member of a set of statements we might call
the "onus-free" set, call it O. For every dialogue, 0 might be specified as some set of
statements such that, for every statement S,
Sl & S2, ",,(SEO & ""SEO) and [(SEO &
SlEO) & «S&Sl)~S2)]~S2EO. Intuitively this means that a set of inherently
plausible claims and their consequences
can be specified in every dialogue, and that
it is possible to reverse the onus whenever a
defense of them is asked for. With the addition of appropriate rules it should be possible to allow a situation where onus can
sometimes be reversed even in the case of
these inherently plausible claims-the formal analogue of a situation where something is initially plausible, but loses its
plausibility owing to further considerations.
I will not, however, pursue such matters
here. I think they are interesting, but it is
much more difficult to say whether this particular aspect of formal theory will advance
our understanding of onus in a way that is of
primary importance for informal logic. On
the contrary, it might be said that it needs a
discussion that goes beyond formal matters,
determining what kind of content decides
the inherent plausibility of claims-and
thus onus-in day to day arguments. At the
very least, the problems with Woods and
Walton's analysis stand as a warning to anyone who wants to develop an analysis of
onus which is very far removed from concrete arguments in ordinary contexts.

IV
So far, I have focused my discussion on
the emphasis Woods and Walton place on
formal analyses of the fallacies. This seems
to me the focus of their book and the most
important issue that it raises. But it is important to add that Woods and Walton havc
many interesting things to say about other
aspects of fallacy theory. Their suggestion
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that a fallacy is an invalid argument which
seems otherwise is, to begin with, a useful
one, keeping fallacy theory squarely in the
bounds of logic, all the while admitting that
it has an important psychological component (see, e.g., pp. 86-87).14 As they point
out, a more psychological approach--one
that sees a fallacy as an argument which is
used unscrupulously, for example-makes
fallacies a function of vague, relative, and
difficult to determine states of mind.
Whether a particular piece of reasoning
counts as a fallacy is, of course, subjective
to some extent and will differ depending on
the context, but this can best be dealt with by
adopting some form of the Woods and Walton suggestion that fallacies be analyzed as
epistemic phenomena. Petitio principii can,
for example, be most usefully seen as a fallacy that must be judged from the point of
view of a particular epistemic contextfrom the point of view of what we know and
do not know. As I have already suggested,
one way to develop such an approach is by
judging such fallacies from the point of
view of the beliefs and knowledge of a particular audience.
In addition to their interesting points
about fallacies in general, Woods and
Walton offer stimulating discussions of
standard treatments of the fallacies. In some
cases, this includes the discussion of historically important analyses, as when they discuss the illuminating view of composition
and division one finds in medieval philosophy. As they point out repeatedly, standard
treatments of the fallacies carelessly group
together very different kinds of arguments
and claims, some of which are valid and
appropriate. My own view is that their
analyses provide a basis that could be used
to construct a more positive typology of
ordinary arguments--one that distinguishes
different forms of good rather than fallacious inference-though this is something
that is still to come. In the present context,
the important point is that they convincingly critique traditional accounts of the fallacies. Some of these accounts are not as
common now as when their articles were

originally published, but it can still be said
that Woods and Walton show that traditional accounts of ad hominem, ad verecundiam, ad populum and many questions are
unacceptable, for there are occasions where
attacks on an individual's reliability, appeals
to authority, appeals to popular sentiment,
and the asking of loaded questions are not
logically--or otherwise-unacceptable.
The chapter of the book I like the most is
Chapter 4, "Ad Baculum." It can serve to
illustrate some of the interesting things that
Woods and Walton have to say about particular fallacies. As they note in their introduction to this fallacy: "Most texts treating of
the fallacies include a section on the ad baculum. in which it is lamented that we should
so often turn to the sword instead of the pen
as a means of persuasion. Our concern will
be whether such threats can be said to constitute instances of a logical fallacy. The
weight of evidence persuades us that the
answer is, 'No'." (p. 47) The basis of this
answer is a critique of textbook analyses of
the fallacy which notes a variety of problems that undermine them.
The first problem Woods and Walton
note is a tendency to ascribe the fallacy ad
baculum to threats which are not arguments, hence improperly called fallacious.
As they say of the typical example "Shut
your face or I'll kick it in":
Its untowardnesses are multiple-in varying contexts it might be illegal, immoral or
undiplomatic, and it is certainly impolitebut what logical sin does it commit? A succinct and pointed answer is that from the
logical point of view this is not an
argument-much less a correct or incorrect
argument-it is a threat. And there is a syntactical initiation of the point: one of its constituent sentences is neither true nor false,
not a declarative sentence at all, but an
imperative .... Much the same can be said
for many typical text-book examples of the
ad baculum. (p. 48)

As Woods and Walton write of Copi's
analysis of the fallacy: "Copi writes that the
fallacy of ad baculum is committed when
force is used to cause a person to accept a
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conclusion [40, p. 74]. But where is the
argument here? If I point a revolver at your
temple to win your acceptance of my view,
what premiss do I advance? Again. I might
use 'force' to cause you to accept or believe
a conclusion, if I subject you to brainwashing or brain surgery, yet not advance an
argument or commit a fallacy, or breach of
argument at all." (p. 53)
One might criticize such suggestions by
arguing that the kind of threat in
question-"Shut your face or I'll kick it,"
for example-implicitly is or at least could
be a constituent of an argument with the
conclusion "You should shut your face." I
will discuss such suggestions shortly, but
we should first note that one might answer
Woods and Walton in a more general way,
rejecting the notion of fallacy their analysis
depends on. Instead of defining a fallacy as
a faulty argument one might, for example,
simply say that a fallacy is something that
one should not do in the context of an
argument. And, assuming that one
shouldn't issue threats in an argument, one
might then conclude that the instances of ad
baculum in question should count as cases
of a fallacy.
There are, however, two problems with
such suggestions. Firstly, they are problematic because they are predicated on a simplistic view of the morality of threats. In
normal contexts, it does seem that threats
are inappropriate, but it is easy to imagine
cases where they are not only permissible,
but obligatory-cases where the only way
to prevent some wrong, say a rape or an
assault, is by issuing a nasty threat. It immediately follows that one cannot say that
threats are never appropriate in argumentative contexts, and that this account of ad
baculum is unsatisfactory.
Secondly, and more deeply, an expansion of the notion of fallacy that encompasses whatever is inappropriate in
argumentative contexts expands the notion
so much that it seems unmanageable.
Indeed, it is hard to see what it doesn't
cover. Clearly, such an expanded notion
incorporates, for example, very complex
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questions of ethics and even etiquette.
These questions do have some bearing on
the understanding of informal inferences
that is the goal of informal logic and
argumentation theory, but the kind of
expertise they require is something that
seems to place them for the most part in a
different discipline. As Woods and Walton
write: "[W]e have suggested that one needs
to take a fairly liberal view of argument if
one is to deal effectively with the fallacies.
since narrowly alethic or classical prooftheoretical representations of argument are
not nearly rich enough to capture the
required nuances. Many fallacies are in fact
essentially epistemic or dialectical. But it
would be ungeometrical if not inflationary
not to draw the line somewhere." (p. 47)
And once we agree to draw the line somewhere, it seems unreasonable to include as
fallacious claims that do not even count as
arguments.
Taking a fallacy to be a fallacious argument, we may tum to the suggestion that the
standard instances of ad baculum are fallacies, because they are fallacious arguments
with some prudential conclusion of the
form "You should do such and such." But
then the problem is that, as Woods and Walton point out, such arguments need not be
invalid, Putting aside the formal mechanism
they use to illustrate this, the inferences
(I) Either I'm right or you don'ttake the car

tonight. Therefore r m right.
(2) If it's your move I'll quit. Therefore it's
my move.

are valid from a prudential point of view
(from the point of view of what we should
accept) if we do assume that "you don't take
the ear tonight" and ''I'll quit" are events
you very much want to avoid. Making this
assumption, it is in each case only by
accepting the proposed conclusion that our
prudential interests can be served. It follows
that "paradigm examples of the fallacy ...
come out of what seemed all appropriate
fragment of semanticalmClchinery as valid
arguments." But: "What then has happened
to the fallacy,?" (p. 50)

110

Leo Groarke

In answer to this question, Woods and
Walton turn to Alex Michalos's suggestion
that ad baculum occurs when an arguer confuses the claim that "some kind of force is
going to be applied unless a certain view is
accepted" with the question whether that
view is true (p. 51). If this kind of confusion
is the case, then ad baculum "would indeed
be a fallacy, an egregious one at that," but
surely Woods and Walton are right when
they suggest that it is hard to see why such a
fallacy should be called ad baculum. "This
fallacy, as virtually all writers agree, consists
in the threat offorce or violence," but it is
not the threat itself, but the confusion of the
prudential conclusion it establishes with the
conclusion that something is true which is
the crux of the fallacious reasoning on the
proposed account (p. 51). And there is, of
course, no reason why the threat could not
occur without this confusion and hence without constituting an actual ad hominem. We
need only imagine that the person issuing the
threat is logically clear headed and does not
make the equivocation Michalos suggests.
It is, I think, useful to add that one
might see ad baculum as a different
equivocation-an equivocation that confuses the prudential "should" with a moral
or rational "should." This, I think, is the
point behind most textbook analyses of the
fallacy, which look askance at the apparent
suggestion that a threat of force can be used
to establish the morality or the rationality of
the conclusion that one should act or believe
in a certain way (taking rationality to be
something distinct from prudence). That
this is a mistake can be seen from the obvious
fact that someone threatening to kick your
face in if you do not write down that you
accept my conclusions in this study cannot
establish the moral or the rational force of
my conclusions, though it could establish
this as a prudent course of actionassuming the person in question was not the
diminutive size I am, was standing next to
you with a huge sledge hammer, etc.
Once again, the problem is that a threat
of force need not commit any such equivocation. On the contrary, those using the

kinds of arguments typically labeled ad
baculum might wholeheartedly agree that
they have not established a moral or a
rational warrant for the course of action
they prescribe-pointing out that they want
one to do something regardless. This is true
even in cases where the proposed course of
action is the morally correct one-say
refraining from a rape. The point, it might
be said, is to stop the rape, not to rationally
or morally establish that this is appropriate
(though this can be established by other
kinds of arguments). So once again the
charge of ad baculum seems to miss the
point: prudential conclusions on the basis of
considerations offorce can be logically justified provided they are not confused with
something else.
The analysis of ad baculum Woods and
Walton present finishes by noting the psychological power of appeals to force, granting that they can playa very significant role
in changing and establishing belief. But as
they suggest: "We are getting now to the
heart of ad baculum, but from the logical
point of view it is the heart of darkness.
True, the use of the appeal to fear is an
important aspect of the psychology of
belief-modification, of propaganda and the
influence of opinion [135]. But the study of
the emotional factors in the modification of
beliefs is the province of psychology, not of
logic." (pp. 52-53)
It seems reasonable to assent to Woods
and Walton's concluding paragraph:
So far, we do not appear to have found any
genuine instances of the ad baculum. To
meet the requirements for an instance of ad
baculum, a sequence would have to be (i) an
argument, (ii) a fallacious or incorrect argument, and (iii) a threat or appeal to force. It
may be possible to produce something that
would meet all three requirements, but we
will not scruple to say that it would take the
rationality of a Tertullian commingled with
the black power of a Svengali actually to
pull the thing off-actually to commit the
fallacy of ad baculum. Needless to say, ours
is a conjecture quite at odds with the usual
treatment of ad baculum in the texts, by
which the fallacy is no rara avis. But until
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the thing is produced, we remain unconvinced. (p. 53)

v
In conclusion, let me reiterate that this is
a useful book which should spark some
interesting discussion-in particular, some
much-needed discussion of the role of formal anal ysis in informal logic and argumentation theory and the relationship between
formal and informal logic. Too often, practitioners in both fields proceed with little
knowledge of what their disciplinary cous-

III

ins are up to, yet firmly committed to the
primary importance of their own endeavours. I have already argued that there are
problems with Woods and Walton's defense
of their commitment to formal analysis, but
it should still raise much-needed comment
and response.
In closing, it should be said that Woods
and Walton's essays are also useful because
of what they have to say about specific fallacies, and the fallacies in general. Though
these essays were published ten to twenty
years ago, it is a mark of their longevity that
they remain pertinent to many aspects of
contemporary discussion. 15
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